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The Federal Courts and  
Constitutional Interpretation 
A Second Amendment Case Study
Mark Kemper
During the recent presidential election campaign, 
political commentators and voters speculated on the 
type of jurists that the candidates would, if elected, 
nominate to serve in the federal judiciary. 
Unsurprisingly, since it sits at the apex of the federal 
judiciary, most attention was placed on the type of 
Supreme Court justices the candidates would select.  
At the moment, 5 members of the Supreme Court are 
age seventy or older, so there is a significant likelihood 
that President-elect Barack Obama will have the 
opportunity to nominate at least 1 or 2 persons to fill 
vacancies on that court. And, on a court that has 
decided many of its most important cases over the last 
several years by either 5–4 or 6–3 votes, altering the 
direction of 1 or 2 votes is important; it means that Mr. 
Obama’s ability to influence the direction of constitu-
tional policy enunciated by the Supreme Court (and the 
federal judiciary in general) could be immense.
Concern with how the new president can, through his 
nominations of federal judges, influence the nation’s 
public policy was on display at one campaign event at 
which both candidates appeared, and during which the 
host asked the candidates which members of the 
current Supreme Court he would not have nominated. 
The answers were telling. Barack Obama said he would 
not have nominated Clarence Thomas because he did 
not think that Justice Thomas possessed the distin-
guished legal resumé to merit an appointment to the 
U.S. Supreme Court. One might speculate on why  
Mr. Obama, the more liberal of the two major party 
candidates running for president, chose Justice Thomas. 
Is it because Justice Thomas happens to cast more 
conservative votes than any other member of the 
current Supreme Court? In contrast, John McCain  
said that he would not have nominated Justices Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, David Souter, and John 
Paul Stevens. These justices, perhaps (not) coinciden-
tally, are the 4 who cast the most liberal votes in cases, 
and thus constitute the entire left flank of the current 
Supreme Court.
What do these answers provided by Obama and 
McCain say about the presidential candidates’ views 
(and, by extension, the views of public officials in 
general) about the proper role of courts in our political 
system, about how courts should decide cases, and 
about the type of judicial philosophies that judges 
should possess? In particular, are presidents and 
members of the U.S. Senate (the body that must 
confirm, by a majority vote, a president’s nominations 
to fill vacant judgeships) interested in finding the most 
qualified and capable jurists? Or, alternatively, are 
presidents, senators, and their political supporters more 
concerned with finding individuals who have a propen-
sity to decide cases consistent with a favored political 
ideology? Perhaps  political elites believe that both goals 
are possible, and that judges 
who use the “proper method” 
of judicial decision making—
and thus fulfill the definition 
of “qualified and capable”—
will have a natural propensity 
to decide cases consistent 
with a particular political 
ideology?
To help answer these ques-
tions, one must first identify 
the various types of methods 
that one would want judges to use when identifying 
and interpreting the laws that are relevant to the 
resolution of cases appearing before their respective 
courts. This is a substantial undertaking. In an effort to 
make it more manageable, we can narrow our focus to 
identifying the methods that we think judges might use 
when they interpret constitutional provisions. After all, 
many people are most concerned with the authority 
that judges have to interpret the U.S. Constitution and 
the power that that gives them to shape public policy 
in the United States. So this seems like a good place  
to start.
What types of legal methods, or “tools,” might judges 
use to interpret constitutional provisions? What devices 
do they have in their “tool box of constitutional 
interpretation”? There are many possible interpretive 
tools, but many students of law agree that a focus on a 
constitution’s text, its original understanding at the 
time it was enacted, legal precedent (i.e., case law), and 















































legitimate factors for consideration by judges. Legal 
scholars might disagree about how much each of these 
interpretive tools should be emphasized, as well as what 
constitutes the proper use of each tool, but they 
typically agree that such tools constitute valid methods 
for interpreting constitutional provisions. More 
controversial are the arguments encouraging judges to 
incorporate into their constitutional decisions the latest 
developments in political, economic, and moral 
philosophy, general pragmatic considerations about 
what constitutes “good public policy,” the domestic 
legal policies of foreign nations, and the various treaties 
and agreements that comprise the vast realm of 
international law.
The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in District of 
columbia vs. Heller, announced on June 26, 2008, 
provides a useful example of the justices using several of 
these tools of constitutional interpretation. Since the 
Court was divided over the proper resolution of the 
case, the Heller decision also illustrates how the justices 
can use the same methods of constitutional interpreta-
tion to reach starkly different conclusions about the 
correct interpretation of the law. At issue in Heller was  
a District of Columbia regulation that prohibited 
individuals, outside of a few narrow exceptions, from 
possessing handguns either on their person or in their 
homes. Heller, a resident of the District, wanted to carry 
a firearm as well as keep it in his home, and so he 
instigated a lawsuit in which he asked the courts to 
issue an injunction prohibiting the District from 
enforcing its firearms regulation against him and other 
similarly situated residents.
The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia 
dismissed Heller’s claim, after which he appealed to the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.  
The appellate court subsequently ruled in his favor  
by arguing that the Second Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution protects an individual’s right to possess 
firearms, and that the D.C. handgun regulation was in 
violation of this right. The District of Columbia 
appealed the case to the U.S. Supreme Court and that 
court affirmed the Circuit Court’s ruling, concluding 
that individuals have a constitutional right to possess 
handguns in their homes and that complete bans on 
such possession are unconstitutional. Let’s take a closer 
look at how the majority and dissenting opinions in the 
case used several of the interpretive tools mentioned 
above to justify their very different conclusions about 
the proper construction of the Second Amendment.
CONSTITUTIONAL TExT 
Not surprisingly, most people agree that an examination 
of the Constitution’s text is the first place to start in a 
case involving a constitutional challenge to  
governmental actions. But, if one is seeking clarity,  
the Constitution’s text can often disappoint. In fact,  
even the provisions of the document that appear clear 
on first inspection turn out to be fraught with potential 
ambiguity. For example, the Constitution says that the 
President must be 35 years of age. Simple enough. But 
how do we know what constitutes the proper method 
for calculating the age of a person running for that 
office? When, precisely, does the age clock start? The 
text of the Constitution does not tell us. This means 
that we will have to go outside of the text to derive 
meaning from even the most “simple” constitutional 
provision.
Of course, this problem is compounded when the text is 
manifestly ambiguous. The Second Amendment is this 
type of text. As that amendment states: “A well 
regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a 
free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, 
shall not be infringed.” In Heller, the majority argued 
that settled principles of legal interpretation in the 
United States require that the amendment be construed 
by placing primary emphasis on the operative clause 
that addresses the right of the people to “keep and bear 
Arms,” and that the prefatory clause discussing a “well 
regulated Militia” should be examined only to the 
extent necessary to clarify ambiguities in the operative 
clause. The one caveat is that judges should not 
interpret the operative text in a way that contradicts 
the prefatory text. 
So here we see the majority drawing instantly from 
something outside of the text (i.e., the interpretive rule 
about how judges should treat prefatory and operative 
provisions in laws) to provide meaning to the Second 
Amendment. The majority went on to argue that, 
because there were no ambiguities in the meaning of the 
operative clause given its original understanding at the 
time of enactment (more on this below), the prefatory 
clause had limited impact on the proper resolution of 
this case. The majority also argued that the consistency 
requirement between the prefatory and operative clause 
was also satisfied, for recognizing that the operative 
clause protects an individual’s right to keep and bear 
arms is not inconsistent with the prefatory clause’s 
focus on well-regulated Militias. After all, citizens who 
possess firearms in their homes can readily participate in 
a citizen militia.
In contrast, the dissenting justices thought that the 
prefatory and operative clauses should be read together 
(particularly since they thought the operative clause 
was ambiguous), and that the meaning of the latter is 
strongly shaped by the former. According to Justice 
Stevens, the prefatory clause constitutes the overriding 
purpose of the Second Amendment, and that purpose 
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was to protect the state’s interest in main-
taining an armed militia comprised of its 
citizens. State militias would serve to 
counter any effort by the national govern-
ment to institute a standing national army, 
and to use that army in a tyrannical fashion 
to destroy the sovereignty of state govern-
ments and the liberty of its citizens. The 
amendment was not designed, nor was it 
understood by citizens at the time of its 
enactment, to constitutionalize an individual 
right to possess firearms for one’s personal 
defense.
ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING 
This brings us to the tool of original under-
standing. Justice Scalia, the author of the 
majority opinion, wrote in Heller that “we 
are guided by the principle that ‘[t]he Constitution was 
written to be understood by the voters; its words and 
phrases were used in their normal and ordinary as 
distinguished from technical meaning.’ Normal 
meaning may of course include an idiomatic meaning, 
but it excludes secret or technical meanings that would 
not have been known to ordinary citizens in the 
founding generation.” According to Justice Antonin 
Scalia and the other members of the majority, judges 
should interpret the words in constitutional provisions 
as they were generally and typically understood by 
ordinary citizens at their respective time of enactment.
After examining founding era dictionary definitions of 
words such as “keep,” “bear,” and “arms,” along with the 
English common law, state constitutions, state and 
federal statutes, and legal commentary circa 1791, the 
Heller majority concluded that the Second Amendment 
was designed to protect both state militias and the 
individual’s right to use firearms to defend one’s home. 
The majority emphasized how the founding generation 
was aware of the historical tendency of governments to 
disarm their citizens and then, using standing armies,  
to impose tyrannical rule. And, again, since the 
possession of firearms was useful toward the mainte-
nance of state militias and self-defense, there is no 
conflict between the prefatory and operative clauses  
of the Second Amendment.
Reviewing the same historical record as the majority, 
the four justices in dissent disagreed with the majority’s 
conclusions about the founding era’s understanding of 
the Second Amendment. In particular, they argued that 
the term “bear arms” was typically understood as 
bearing arms as a soldier in a military context, and that 
the term “keep” was inseparable from the term bear— 
it did not add anything to the Second Amendments  
sole purpose of protecting state militias. As such, the 
Second Amendment recognizes a collective right to keep 
and bear arms, not the individual right that the 
majority identifies. 
The dissenting justices understood that individuals may 
keep arms in their homes as part of a well-regulated 
state militia so that they can “bear” them on a moments 
notice when the militia is mustered as part of a 
defensive effort to keep the peace in the state. Yet 
because the drafters of the Second Amendment 
recognized that state militias need to be well regulated 
in order to be effective, they left it ultimately in the 
hands of state governments to decide how firearms 
should be distributed. As such, a state government  
(but not the federal government) has the authority to 
unilaterally limit the degree to which its citizens may 
keep arms in their homes; in fact, as Judge Richard 
Posner has noted, it might in some circumstances make 
more public security sense for the state to store arms at 
a central depot where they are easily retrieved rather 
than let them be scattered throughout the land in 
private homes. In short, the dissenting justices thought 
that the Second Amendment, as ordinarily understood 
at the time of its enactment, was designed to prevent 
the federal government from disarming state militias. 
Nor more, and no less.
LEGAL PRECEDENT 
The Heller majority examined 19th century case law, and 
concluded that those “cases that interpreted the Second 
Amendment universally support an individual right 
unconnected to militia service.” The majority also 
concluded that its interpretation of the Second 
Amendment was not inconsistent with the limited 
number of Supreme Court decisions interpreting that 















































a 1939 case, United States vs. miller, in which the Court 
unanimously held that an individual could be prosecut-
ed for violating a federal law prohibiting the transporta-
tion of certain guns across state lines. In that case, 
Miller was prosecuted for transporting a sawed-off 
shotgun, and the Court upheld his conviction by 
emphasizing that the weapon was not one typically 
used in a military context. In reviewing this case, the 
Heller majority argued that the miller decision was not 
inconsistent with the notion that individuals have 
Second Amendment rights to possess weapons for 
self-defense, as long as those weapons have a reasonable 
military use and are the type that are ordinarily 
possessed by the citizenry (thus, sawed-off shotguns, 
fully automatic machine guns, and shoulder-mounted 
rocket launchers would not qualify). The majority 
concluded that most handguns meet these two 
requirements.
In contrast, the dissenting opinion in Heller thought 
that the miller precedent was based on the principle 
that the Second Amendment was designed to protect 
state militias, and that it did not in any way support the 
idea that individuals have the right to possess firearms 
independent from their participation in a state’s militia. 
After all, the dissent argued, many firearms that do not 
have a common military use could be used to protect 
one’s personal safety inside or outside of their home 
(including sawed-off shotguns, machine guns, and, 
conceivably, shoulder-mounted rocket launchers!). 
Therefore, the Second Amendment’s sole mission must 
be that of protecting state militias, otherwise the miller 
decision’s focus on weapons that are suitable for 
military use does not make sense. If the amendment 
was designed to protect both state militias and provide 
for personal self-defense, then it would not be sensible 
for courts to recognize only those weapons that are 
useful for one of those purposes.
HISTORY AND TRADITION  
The majority in Heller also spent considerable time 
examining 18th, 19th and 20th century laws, legal 
commentary and customs pertaining to the regulation 
of firearms. On balance, it concluded from its analysis 
that there was a long practice recognizing the individu-
al's right to possess firearms—including handguns. 
Indeed, the majority emphasizes that a culture of 
handgun ownership has evolved to make handguns  
“the most popular weapon chosen by Americans for 
self-defense in the home.” In dissent, Justice Breyer took 
issue with this approach. He wrote: “According to the 
majority's reasoning, if congress and the States lift restric-
tions on the possession and use of machine guns, and people 
buy machine guns to protect their homes, the court will have 
to reverse course and find that the Second Amendment does, in 
fact, protect the individual self-defense-related right to possess 
a machine gun. On the majority's reasoning, if tomorrow 
someone invents a particularly useful, highly dangerous 
self-defense weapon, congress and the States had better ban 
it immediately, for once it becomes popular congress will no 
longer possess the constitutional authority to do so. In essence, 
the majority determines what regulations are permissible by 
looking to see what existing regulations permit. There is  
no basis for believing that the Framers intended such  
circular reasoning.”
WHAT LEGAL DOCTRINE WAS ESTABLISHED  
IN HeLLer?  
 In his dissent, Justice Breyer argued that the majority 
did not provide a clear enunciation of the rule or 
standard that it was using to reach its conclusion that 
the D.C. regulation violated the Second Amendment. 
Yet a variety of standards exist that the Court might 
have adopted. For instance, in some contexts courts will 
assess the constitutionality of governmental actions by 
applying what is known as the rational-basis test. When 
using this test, the court asks whether the government 
is acting in a way to promote its interests (which we 
hope, in a democracy, are aligned with the public’s 
interests!) by (1) exercising its authority to promote 
government interests that are reasonably related to a 
power granted to the government in the Constitution, 
where (2) the law in question is rationally related to 
furthering those interests. This is a very deferential 
standard of judicial review and it normally results in a 
court upholding the constitutionality of the govern-
ment’s action. In Heller, the majority stated that the 
Second Amendment requires a standard more demand-
ing than rational-basis review, but it declined to specify 
what that standard is.
Justice Breyer did not think that the majority was 
advocating the adoption of the most stringent standard 
of judicial review, commonly referred to as strict 
scrutiny (although the majority didn’t explicitly say 
that it was not using this standard). This standard of 
review is used when a litigant challenges a govern-
ment’s actions by arguing that the government has 
infringed upon a fundamental constitutional right and/
or acted on the basis of “suspect” classifications (e.g., the 
government has discriminated along racial/ethnic or 
religious lines). When using strict scrutiny, a court will 
evaluate whether the government has acted constitu-
tionally by asking whether the government’s actions are 
designed to promote a compelling state interest (not 
just an ordinary, hum-drum state interest), and whether 
its actions are narrowly tailored to promote that 
interest (e.g., does the government encroach upon the 
fundamental right or discriminate along racial or 
religious lines more than is necessary to effectively 
accomplish its compelling state interest). The court will 
declare the government’s actions unconstitutional if it 
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concludes that the government is not seeking to further 
a compelling interest or if the law is not narrowly 
tailored to further that interest.
So, for the majority in Heller, the rational-basis test was 
not sufficiently protective of the individual’s right to 
“keep and bear arms,” while the strict scrutiny standard 
was seemingly too protective. Since the Court did not 
identify what standard of review or legal doctrine 
would be employed in Second Amendment cases, one 
can only guess that it is something in between rational-
basis review and strict scrutiny. Justice Beyer argued, in 
dissent, that the Court should adopt an “interest 
balancing” approach by asking “whether the statute 
burdens a protected interest in a way or to an extent 
that is out of proportion to the statute's salutary effects 
upon other important governmental interests.” But  
the majority did not think much of Justice Breyer’s 
standard (referring to it as “judge-empowering” and a 
“freestanding” approach that provides “no constitution-
al guarantee at all” to Second Amendment rights), and 
instead explained that the standard of review in these 
types of cases will need to be developed over time, on a 
case-by-case basis, as the Court decides cases involving 
Second Amendment challenges to firearms regulations.
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
The rule of law has many facets but one critical 
component is that neutral judges decide cases based on 
legitimate sources of law rather than their personal 
policy preferences or some other arbitrary, non-legal 
criteria. With this in mind, many of the tools of 
constitutional interpretation are designed to constrain 
the discretion that judges have when deciding constitu-
tional cases. When judges encounter ambiguous 
constitutional text, they are expected to turn to things 
such as the text’s original understanding, legal prec-
edent, and historical practice and tradition—as opposed 
to considering their own ideological leanings or personal 
biases. In Heller, we see both the majority and dissent-
ing justices attempting to utilize such tools, yet, in 
doing so, reaching very different conclusions.
One can speculate on why this is the case. For instance, 
one might surmise that these tools are merely window 
dressings designed to hide the fact that the personal 
policy preferences of the justices are the principal forces 
behind their votes. There is a significant body of 
research arguing—and supporting with empirical 
data—that this is indeed the case. Specifically, Judge 
Richard Posner has questioned the validity of original-
ism as a tool of constitutional interpretation by arguing 
that its results are typically the product of shoddy “law 
office history,” and that it serves as nothing more than 
“the historicizing glaze on personal values and prefer-
ences.” Yet Judge Posner does not offer an alternative 
method for interpreting constitutional texts that does 
not have its own serious problems—particularly that of 
granting judges even more discretion than they have 
when using the methods discussed above.
What we did not see in Heller was a member of the 
Court resorting to some of the more controversial 
methods for deriving the meaning of constitutional 
text, such as by examining the domestic laws in other 
nations or those of the international order, by examin-
ing current social mores and opinions (although to some 
extent the Heller majority did this when it mentioned 
the prevalence of handguns in the contemporary United 
States) or by delving into the latest developments in 
moral and political philosophy. These criteria have been 
used by judges in other cases, but they often trigger 
intense opposition from critics who contend that the 
judges are exceeding their legitimate authority by not 
applying previously established laws, and that they are 
instead legislating from the bench (something that 
many find inappropriate behavior for life-tenured 
federal judges in a constitutional democracy premised 
on the rule of law).
In any event, one thing is clear: citizens need to pay 
more attention to what courts are doing and how 
judges attempt to justify and explain their decisions. 
Public officials and political activists have long recog-
nized the importance of the judiciary and that is why 
we hear the courts being discussed so frequently during 
presidential campaigns. It also explains the vicious 
battles over judicial nominations that we have wit-
nessed during the last 25 years. For better or for worse, 
the power that judges have to interpret the U.S. 
Constitution gives them the ability to radically shape 
the contours of public policy in the nation.
This is clearly demonstrated in the Heller case; the menu 
of gun regulation policies available to federal policy 
makers was truncated substantially by the Court’s 
decision in that case (and if the decision is extended to 
cover state and local governments—as most suspect it 
will be—its effect on public policy will be even more 
pronounced). But other areas of public policy can be 
equally constrained (or unconstrained if the courts do 
not limit the scope of governmental power) by the 
constitutional decisions of courts. Consequently, it is 
imperative that citizens pay critical attention to the 
work of courts and judges if they want to preserve for 
future generations the rights and liberties of individuals, 
the republican system of government, and the core 
principles of the rule of law that are provided by the  
U.S. Constitution.
—mark Kemper is Associate Professor of Political Science.
